USA v. Kadeem Thomas by unknown
2021 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-5-2021 
USA v. Kadeem Thomas 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2021 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Kadeem Thomas" (2021). 2021 Decisions. 128. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2021/128 
This February is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 




DLD-080        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 











                           Appellant 
 ____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the District Court 
of the Virgin Islands 
(D.V.I. Crim. No. 3:12-cr-00002-003) 
District Judge: Honorable Robert A. Molloy 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal as Untimely Under Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 4(b)(1) and for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 
and I.O.P. 10.6 
January 28, 2021 
Before:  JORDAN, KRAUSE, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges 
 






* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 





Kadeem Thomas is a federal inmate currently confined at FCI Yazoo City Low in 
Mississippi. Thomas appeals from an order denying his COVID-19-based motion for 
compassionate release. We will affirm.   
I. 
A jury sitting in the District Court of the Virgin Islands found Thomas guilty of 
Hobbs Act conspiracy, bank robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission 
of a crime of violence. He received concurrent 60-month sentences for the conspiracy and 
bank robbery convictions, and a consecutive, mandatory-minimum sentence of 84 months 
for the firearm conviction. Thomas’s direct appeal, see United States v. Browne, 525 F. 
App’x 213 (3d Cir. 2013), and first motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a), see United States 
v. Thomas, C.A. No. 17-3261 (3d Cir. April 30, 2018), were unsuccessful.1 
In April 2020, Thomas filed a pro se motion for compassionate release under 18 
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), based on the proliferation of COVID-19. The District Court 
denied the motion without prejudice, for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.  
Thomas refiled his motion soon after. He cited COVID-19 statistics for Yazoo 
City Low and the BOP generally. He noted that he had served 8 years of a 12-year 
sentence, that he had a clean disciplinary record while in prison, and that he had plans for 
future employment (a job with a trucking company) and residency (with his mother). 
 




Thomas also claimed to have a medical condition worthy of consideration, though he did 
not elaborate as to what that condition might be.       
In response, the Government filed an opposition outlining at length the steps the 
BOP has taken to control the spread of COVID-19 in federal prisons. It also argued, 
consistent with the coda in United States v. Raia, 954 F.3d 594 (3d Cir. 2020), that no 
relief is due because “Thomas claims no medical or health conditions” and “[i]n effect” 
contends “that the pandemic itself justifies his release. The success of such an argument 
would necessitate the wholescale release of the entire federal prison population.” DC 
ECF No. 191 at 6.  
Thomas replied, arguing that COVID-19 rates had been particularly high at Yazoo 
City Low. Thomas did not refute the Government’s assertion that he failed to identify a 
medical or other reason why he might be more susceptible to infection than any other 
BOP inmate; instead, he gathered a handful of anecdotes of seemingly healthy people 
catching and succumbing to the virus. 
The District Court agreed with the Government’s arguments and denied relief by 
order entered on September 15, 2020. See DC ECF No. 194. The District Court explained 
that it was Thomas’s “burden to show he is entitled to a sentence reduction pursuant to 
Section 3582(c)(1),” and that he had not shouldered that burden. DC ECF No. 193 at 4. 
Relying on Raia, the District Court determined that Thomas failed to demonstrate “any 




District Court determined as well that, even if Thomas had advanced a compelling basis 
for relief, he nevertheless failed to address the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement 
concerning an inmate’s dangerousness and “whether a reduction in his sentence would be 
consistent with the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” DC ECF No. 193 at 5. This 
appeal followed.2 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for abuse of discretion 
the District Court’s order denying Thomas’s motion for compassionate release. 
See United States v. Pawlowski, 967 F.3d 327, 330 (3d Cir. 2020). “An abuse of 
discretion exists when the decision rests ‘on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly 
erroneous assessment of the evidence.’” Hope v. Warden York Cnty. Prison, 972 F.3d 
310, 320 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). 
III. 
 Section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) authorizes compassionate release based on an 
“extraordinary and compelling” reason. We agree with the District Court that Thomas’s 
motion was not supported by such a reason. 
 
2 Section 3582(c) is considered part of a litigant’s criminal proceedings, so the fourteen-
day appeal window set forth in Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A) applies. See United States v. 
Payton, 979 F.3d 388, 389-90 (6th Cir. 2020) (per curiam order); cf. United States v. 
Chapple, 847 F.3d 227, 228 (5th Cir. 2017). Thomas’s notice of appeal is dated 
September 25, 2020, see DC ECF No. 195, and he has sworn under penalty of perjury 
that that was the date of the document’s transmission to the prison mailing system, see 




In Raia, we observed that “the mere existence of COVID-19 in society and the 
possibility that it may spread to a particular prison alone cannot independently justify 
compassionate release, especially considering BOP’s statutory role, and its extensive and 
professional efforts to curtail the virus’s spread.” 954 F.3d at 597. In other words, an 
inmate must point to something more than the existence of COVID-19. Before the 
District Court, however, Thomas identified no reason why, despite the BOP’s efforts to 
control the virus, he is more vulnerable to it than other inmates. Cf. Pawlowski, 967 F.3d 
at 330. Additionally, the District Court noted that at the time of its decision there were no 
active cases of COVID-19 at Yazoo City Low.3 
For those reasons, we cannot say that the District Court abused its discretion in 
denying relief. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment below. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4 
(2011); 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6 (2018).4       
 
Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988).   
 
3 A more recent review of the BOP’s website reveals seven active cases: two inmates and 
five staff. See https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus/ (last visited January 27, 2021).  
 
4 As noted above, in addition to the required demonstration of an “extraordinary and 
compelling” reason for release under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), an inmate seeking 
compassionate release must merit a favorable assessment using the § 3553(a) factors and 
the Sentencing Commission’s applicable policy statements. See Pawlowski, 967 F.3d at 
329 & n.6. While the District Court’s determination under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) is correct 
and dispositive, we note that our affirmance should not be interpreted to suggest 
agreement with the District Court’s alternative determination that Thomas failed to 
address any of the § 3553(a) factors. Cf. id. at 331 (indicating that the time remaining on 
a prisoner’s sentence is a relevant consideration in determining whether the § 3553(a) 
factors support a grant of compassionate release). 
